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INTRODUCTION 
conomies benefit from quality infrastructure investment.1 The 
World Bank developed a rule of thumb for a stimulation effect 
on economic growth arising from infrastructure investment—
“[t]urning a $1 grant into $2 income.”2 That is, each dollar invested in 
transportation, energy, and residential infrastructure may generate a 
multiple expansion of output.3 Generally, infrastructure investment 
promotes a “multiplier effect”4—an increase in spending of 1% of the 
GDP runs a multiplier effect as high as two and a half times more in 
three years.5 However, the multiplier effect varies in different countries 
and in different sectors.6 Empirical studies show that investment in 
infrastructure prior to the subprime crisis played a mainly positive role 
in China’s economic growth.7 For example, when testing provincial 
panel data from 1993 to 2004, the numbers show that transport 
investments created spatial spillover effects8 on provincial economic 
growth, including both positive spatial clustering in developed eastern 
coast regions and negative spatial spillovers such as pollution.9 Further 
* Dr. Jin Sheng is a senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore (NUS)
Faculty of Law. This Article is funded by NUS Centre for Banking and Finance Law and 
NUS EW Barker Centre for Law and Business. All dollar amounts are in U.S. currency. 
1 Quality infrastructure investment is positively related to sustainable growth and 
development, economic efficiency, as well as environmental, social, and governance 
integration. See MINISTRY OF FIN. JAPAN, G20 PRINCIPLES FOR QUALITY 
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT 1, https://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_policy/ 
convention/g20/annex6_1.pdf.  
2 JOSEPH HANLON ET AL., JUST GIVE MONEY TO THE POOR: THE DEVELOPMENT 
REVOLUTION FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH (2010). 
3 David Alan Aschauer, Is Public Expenditure Productive?, 23 J. MONETARY ECON. 
177, 179 (1989).  
4 The “multiplier effect” arises from the injection of new demand. That is, an injection 
in the circular flow of extra income creates more spending, which further generates more 
income, and so on. Thus, any new injection of spending leads to an increase in income. 
Conversely, a withdrawal or a leak from the circular flow results in a downward multiplier. 
5 The multiplier effects of an increase in spending of 1% of GDP from 2015 to 2017 in 
the U.K., China, India, U.S., and Japan were 2.5%, 2.2%, 2.0%, 1.7%, and 1.5% 
respectively. See Abhishek Dangra, The Missing Piece in India’s Economic Growth Story: 
Robust Infrastructure, S&P GLOBAL (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.spglobal.com/en/research-
insights/articles/the-missing-piece-in-indias-economic-growth-story-robust-infrastructure. 
6 See generally id. at 14–23. 
7 See Xueliang Zhang, Transport Infrastructure, Spatial Spillover and Economic 
Growth: Evidence from China, 3 FRONTIERS OF ECON. IN CHINA 585 (2008). 
8 “Spillover effect” in economics means that an economic event in one context may have 
an impact on other events in a seemingly unrelated context. The spatial spillover effect 
concerns externality of the spillover effect. It can be either negative or positive.  
9 Zhang, supra note 7. 
E 
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research, based on data from all thirty-one provinces from 1998 to 
2007, shows that investment in both land and water transportation 
infrastructure, especially in areas with poor land transport 
infrastructure, had positively contributed to economic growth.10 Also, 
infrastructure facilitates trade.11 Participating countries benefit from 
economic growth and actual profits through promoting both cross-
border and regional trade, as well as developing industrial parks and 
social infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, and healthcare. 
However, the positive effects of infrastructure investment should not 
be exaggerated because poorly managed construction projects 
negatively affect economic development.12 Even in China, massive 
infrastructure investment resulted in a heavy debt load.13 In fact, there 
is an ongoing debate over the relationship between China’s economic 
growth and its strategy of obsessive infrastructure investment.14 
Moreover, some developing countries may suffer from financial risks 
and a heavy debt burden. For instance, two risky infrastructure 
investments include the $15 billion China-Uzbekistan investment 
transaction, which is almost equal to 25% of Uzbekistan’s GDP,15 and 
the $24 billion China-Bangladesh agreement signed in October of 
2016, which is around 20% of Bangladesh’s GDP.16  
10 Junjie Hong et al., Transport Infrastructure and Regional Economic Growth: 
Evidence from China, 38 FRONTIERS OF ECON. IN CHINA 737 (2011). 
11 See Philippa Dee et al., Trade Facilitation: What, Why, How, Where and When?, in 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRADE IN ASIA 28 (Douglas H. Brooks & Jayant Menon eds., 2008). 
12 Nicklas Garemo et al., Megaprojects: The Good, the Bad, and the Better, 
MCKINSEY & CO. (July 2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-
infrastructure/our-insights/megaprojects-the-good-the-bad-and-the-better. 
13 China used to believe that an annual growth in infrastructure investment of 15%–18% 
could generate 8% economic growth. It turns out that massive investment in unproductive 
projects results in a boom initially, and then becomes a drag on economic growth. 
Overinvestment in unproductive infrastructure also results in heavy debts and economic 
fragility. See Atif Ansar et al., Does Infrastructure Investment Lead to Economic Growth or 
Economic Fragility? Evidence from China, 32 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL’Y 360 (2016). 
14 See Gabriel Wildau, China Infrastructure Investment Model Under Fire, FIN. TIMES 
(Sept. 11, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/b1d9177c-7650-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a; 
see also Ravi Prasad, Roads to Nowhere: Asia’s Risky Obsession with Infrastructure, THE 
DIPLOMAT (Jan. 9, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/roads-to-nowhere-asias-risky-
obsession-with-infrastructure/.  
15 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, UN Warns About Financial Risks in China’s One Belt One 
Road Project, THE ECON. TIMES (May 25, 2017), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ 
news/defence/un-warns-about-financial-risks-in-chinas-one-belt-one-road-
project/printarticle/58831087.cms. 
16 Id. 
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Over the last few years, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) expanded 
the previous One Belt, One Road project (OBOR) to five routes. 
The “belt” in OBOR refers to the land routes for road and rail 
transportation, which is called the “Silk Road Economic Belt.”17 The 
“road” in OBOR refers to the sea routes or the “21st Century Maritime 
Silk Road.”18 The three other routes are the Polar Silk Road,19 the Green 
Silk Road (since 2017),20 and the Digital Silk Road (since 2018).21 
As a long-term development strategy, the BRI is scheduled from 
2013 to approximately 2049.22 The BRI involves three objectives: 
(1) exporting overcapacity, (2) exporting soft power, and (3) realizing
RMB internationalization. The OBOR map is centered on China and
expands in five directions—North line A, North line B, Middle line,
South line, and Central line.23
In sum, this Article contains four parts. First, Part I, “Supply and 
Demand of Infrastructure Investment,” maps the supply and demand of 
the Asian infrastructure market, the imbalance between supply and 
demand for infrastructure investment, and the landscape of competing 
development visions. Next, Part II, “OBOR’s Opportunities,” discusses 
OBOR’s opportunities and spillover effects as a regional public good.  
17 The “Silk Road Economic Belt” is a framework of “bringing together China, Central 
Asia, Russia and Europe (the Baltic); linking China with the Persian Gulf and the 
Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West Asia; and connecting China with 
Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean.” NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N, 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF CHINA, VISION AND 
ACTIONS ON JOINTLY BUILDING SILK ROAD ECONOMIC BELT AND 21ST-CENTURY 
MARITIME SILK ROAD (2015), http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_ 
669367.html. 
18 Id. The “Silk Road Economic Belt” aims to “go from China’s coast to Europe through 
the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and from China’s coast through the 
South China Sea to the South Pacific in the other.” 
19 THE STATE COUNCIL OF CHINA, CHINA’S ARCTIC POLICY (2018), http://www.catl. 
org.cn/2018-02/02/content_50391577.htm. 
20 The “Green Silk Road” was also proposed by Russia in the Green Silk Road Initiative 
Declaration, GREEN SILK ROAD NETWORK (Nov. 18, 2016), http://greensilkroad.net/ 
declaration/. The first Green Silk Road Fund was launched in Beijing in March 2015. See 
Liu Qin, China’s New Silk Road Could Expand Asia’s Deserts, THE DIPLOMAT (Sept. 10, 
2016), https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/chinas-new-silk-road-could-expand-asias-deserts/. 
21 The Digital Silk Road is an investment of $200 billion USD. See China’s Talks of 
Building a ‘Digital Silk Road,’ THE ECONOMIST (May 31, 2018), https://www.economist. 
com/china/2018/05/31/china-talks-of-building-a-digital-silk-road. 
22 Jonathan E. Hillman, How Big Is China’s Belt and Road?, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & 
INT’L STUD. (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-big-chinas-belt-and-road. 
23 One Belt One Road Initiative, TOP CHINA TRAVEL, https://www.topchinatravel.com/ 
silk-road/one-belt-one-road.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2019).  
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Then, Part III, “OBOR’s Risks,” analyzes the major risks among 
the aforementioned barriers to investment, including (a) sovereign and 
credit risks, (b) political and corruption risks, (c) foreign exchange 
risks, (d) limited product offerings and liquidity constraints, and 
(e) deal implementation risks. Recent cases show that developing
countries may suffer from financial risks and a heavy debt burden.
Moreover, geopolitical factors matter, too. In particular, I examine the
different visions of the United States and China surrounding how the
OBOR program affects the existing international economic order.
Finally, Part IV, “OBOR’s Financial Risks and Case Study,” 
examines OBOR countries’ financial risks, Pakistan’s rising debt 
distress in the case of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), 
and China’s financial risks as a BRI lender. I conclude by showing that 
developing quality, sustainable, and inclusive infrastructure is 
imperative for developing countries and emerging economies in Asia.  
I 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT 
A. Asia – The World’s Most Dynamic Region
As the world’s most dynamic region, Asia delivers about 60% of 
global growth.24 In 2016, Asia’s entire gross domestic product (GDP) 
increased 5.8%. Moreover, Asia’s GDP was expected to increase 5.7% 
in both 2017 and 2018.25 To keep up with competition, countries should 
invest in economic infrastructure each year, ranging from 3% of GDP 
for developed economies to 9% or more of GDP for emerging 
economies.26 In 2014 it was estimated that, to keep Asian countries 
competitive, they should invest between $800 billion to $1.3 trillion 
annually until 2020.27  
24 ASIAN DEV. BANK, EXPANDING ECONOMIES IN ASIA DELIVER 60% OF GLOBAL 
GROWTH (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.adb.org/news/expanding-economies-asia-deliver-60-
global-growth-adb. 
25 ASIAN DEV. BANK, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK 2017: TRANSCENDING  
THE MIDDLE-INCOME CHALLENGE xii (2017), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/ 
publication/237761/ado-2017.pdf.  
26 WORLD ECON. FORUM, STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE: STEPS TO PRIORITIZE AND 
DELIVER INFRASTRUCTURE EFFECTIVELY AND EFFICIENTLY 3 (2012), https://www. 
weforum.org/reports/strategic-infrastructure-steps-prioritize-and-deliver-infrastructure-
effectively-and-efficiently. 
27 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, DEVELOPING INFRASTRUCTURE IN ASIA PACIFIC: 
OUTLOOK, CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 7 (2014), https://www.pwc.com/sg/en/capital-
projects-infrastructure/assets/cpi-develop-infrastructure-in-ap-201405.pdf. 
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According to an early report from the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), the estimated demand for infrastructure investment from 2010 
to 2020, which included energy, transportation, water, sanitation, and 
telecommunications, was $776 billion each year: $747 billion for 
national infrastructure and $29 billion for regional infrastructure.28 
These investments involved over 1,200 regional infrastructure 
projects.29 While many countries cut back spending on infrastructure 
after the 2008 financial crisis, a conservative estimate for infrastructure 
investment during the same period shows $8.3 trillion in new 
investment.30 In 2017, the ADB raised its prediction of Asia’s 
infrastructure needs to $22.6 trillion from 2016 to 2030, which is 
$1.5 trillion per year. Correspondingly, the climate-adjusted needs are 
estimated at $26.2 trillion, which is $1.7 trillion per year, including 
$14.7 trillion for power, $8.4 trillion for transportation, $2.3 trillion for 
telecommunications, and $800 billion for water and sanitation.31  
Within Asia, demand for infrastructure is not evenly allocated. 
China and Japan both heavily overinvested in infrastructure. 
Additionally, Singapore’s infrastructure ranks the top in the world. The 
infrastructure investment needs for other subregions such as Central 
Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and South 
Asia are 7.8%, 5.7%, and 8.8% of GDP, respectively.32 Meanwhile, 
Asia’s infrastructure deficit is another problem.33 The ADB warned of 
an estimated 2.4% gap of projected GDP between actual and required 
spending on infrastructure from 2016 to 2020.34  
Urbanization will play a key role in the development of Asia in two 
or three decades. The United Nations predicts that the world population 
(7.55 billion in 2017) will reach 8.55 billion in 2030, 9.77 billion in 
28 Biswa Nath Bhattacharyay, Estimating Demand for Infrastructure in Energy, 
Transport, Telecommunications, Water and Sanitation in Asia and the Pacific: 2010-2020, 
at 20 (ASIAN DEV. BANK INST., Working Paper No. 248, 2010), http://www.adb.org/ 
sites/default/files/publication/156103/adbi-wp248.pdf. 
29 Id. at 16.  
30 Id. at 20.  
31 ASIAN DEV. BANK, MEETING ASIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS: HIGHLIGHTS at xi 
(2017), https://www.adb.org/publications/asia-infrastructure-needs. 
32 Id. at xiv. 
33 According to ADB, Asia needs to invest $1.7 trillion per year on infrastructure from 
2016 to 2030, but the financial gap is as large as 5% of GDP. See id. at xiii, xvi. 
34 Michael Peel & Tom Mitchell, Asia’s $26tn Infrastructure Gap Threatens Growth, 
ADB Warns, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/79d9e36e-fd0b-11e6-
8d8e-a5e3738f9ae4.  
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2050, and 11.18 billion in 2100.35 The United Nations further predicts 
an increase of 2.5 billion in urban population by 2050, and Asia and 
Africa contain nearly 90% of all new urban inhabitants.36 By 2050, 
two-thirds of the world’s inhabitants will live in cities.37 To reduce air 
pollution and greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) and to realize low-
carbon development, the world should spend at least $1 trillion per year 
in clean energy because demand for energy could increase more than 
one-third by 2040.38 
In 2015, 59.8% and 16.1% of the world’s population lived in Asia 
and Africa, respectively. Nearly 80% of the world’s inhabitants will 
likely live in Asia and Africa by 2050.39 Because high population 
density is tied to urbanization, demand for urban infrastructure in Asia 
and Africa will be great. Regarding the ASEAN countries, according 
to the ADB, the need for infrastructure investment in Southeast Asia 
from 2016 to 2030 will be $2.76 trillion. Because many relatively small 
projects are valued between $5 million and $70 million, Singapore will 
provide bank loans for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) across 
the region to obtain opportunities to participate in many projects.40  
B. Gaps and Imbalance in Infrastructure Investment
Globally, infrastructure investment needs range from $5 to $7 
trillion each year. Yet, developing countries’ annual investment needs 
range from $3.5 to $4.5 trillion each year, which includes needs related 
35 Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Aff., Rep. on the World Population Prospects: The 2017 
Revision: Key Findings and Advance Tables, U.N. Working Paper No. ESA/P/WP/248, at 
1 (2017), https://population.un.org/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2017_KeyFindings.pdf. 
36 Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Aff., Rep. on the World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 
Revision, Highlights, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/352, at 2 (July 10, 2014), https:// 
population.un.org/wup/Publications/Files/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf.  
37 Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Aff., Rep. on the World Urbanization Prospects: The 2018 
Revision, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER/A/420, at xix (2019), https://population.un.org/wup/ 
Publications/Files/WUP2018-Report.pdf. 
38 Julia Zuckerman et al., Investing at Least a Trillion Dollars a Year in Clean Energy 3 
(New Climate Economy, Working Paper, 2016), https://newclimateeconomy.report/ 
workingpapers/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2016/05/NCE_CleanEnergy_financing_final_ 
web-Copy.pdf.  
39 Gerhard K. Heilig, U.N. World Population Prospects, the 2015 Revisions (Sept. 7, 
2015), http://www.gerhard-k-heilig.com/main/ppt/ISES_WPP2015_Rev8_Final.pdf. 
40 Wong Wei Han, Helping SMEs Tap Asia’s Boom in Infrastructure, THE STRAITS 
TIMES (Apr. 15, 2017), http://www.sgsme.sg/news/money/helping-smes-tap-asias-boom-
infrastructure. 
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to basic infrastructure and social infrastructure.41 However, according 
to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), current infrastructure finances do not meet infrastructure 
needs. For example, based upon their economic growth rates in 2014, 
the annual gap for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to meet the 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) investment needs should be 
around $1.6 trillion.42 In fact, emerging markets and developing 
countries account for nearly two-thirds of global infrastructure 
investment needs, including: China–34%; India–8%; Middle East–4%; 
Other Emerging Asia–6%; Eastern Europe–4%; Africa–2%; and Latin 
America–6%.43  
However, over the last decade, global economies underinvested in 
infrastructure. During the last decade, many countries, including both 
developed and developing economies, underinvested in infrastructure 
because of impacts arising out of the global financial crisis. In 2007, 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) estimated that the world would need to invest approximately 
3.5% of its GDP in infrastructure each year until 2030 to preserve 
current economic growth and social development trends.44  
Potentially, there are various financing sources of $120 trillion on 
the basis of assets under management (AUM) of global institutional 
investors in 2015: (i) banks–$40.2 trillion; (ii) investment companies–
$29.0 trillion; (iii) insurance companies–$26.5 trillion; (iv) public 
pensions and superannuation plans–$10.9 trillion; (v) sovereign wealth 
funds–$6.3 trillion; (vi) infrastructure operators and developers–$3.4 
trillion; (vii) infrastructure and private equity funds–$2.7 trillion; 
(viii) endowments and foundations–$1 trillion.45 If these public and
private sources of capital are effectively invested in sustainable
infrastructure projects, that can reduce the investment gap.
41 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2014, at xi, 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf.  
42 Id. 
43 Jonathan Woetzel et al., Bridging Infrastructure Gaps: Has the World Made 
Progress? MCKINSEY & CO. 4 (Oct. 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-
projects-and-infrastructure/our-insights/bridging-infrastructure-gaps-has-the-world-made-
progress. 
44 Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., Mapping Policy for Electricity, Water and 
Transport 13 (June 2007), https://www.oecd.org/futures/infrastructureto2030/40953164.pdf. 
45 Aaron Bielenberg et al., Financing Change: How to Mobilize Private-Sector 
Financing for Sustainable Infrastructure, MCKINSEY & CO. 14 (Jan. 2016), https:// 
newclimateeconomy.report/workingpapers/workingpaper/financing-change-how-to-
mobilize-private-sector-financing-for-sustainable-infrastructure/. 
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Of that $120 trillion, about 87% is directly or indirectly owned by 
high-income countries and 11% is owned by upper middle-income 
countries.46 By 2020, AUM is estimated to be: $43 trillion in the Asia-
Pacific, which accounts for more than 40% of global AUM; $42 trillion 
in Europe; $4 trillion in the Middle East and Africa; $2 trillion in Latin 
America and the Caribbean; and $31 trillion in North America.47 Due 
to the enormous investment gap in infrastructure, the world could lose 
$1 to $1.3 trillion each year until 2030.48 Table 1 shows infrastructure 
investment gaps over the next two decades. 
Table 1. Gaps Between Infrastructure Financing Needs and Supply of 
Investments 
Initiative 
Financing Needs 
for Infrastructure 
Supply of 
Investments 
Investment 
Gap 
McKinsey 
Global 
Institute 
(MGI) 
At least $57 trillion in 
new infrastructure 
from 2016 to 2030;49 
$3.7 trillion per year 
from 2017 to 2035 to 
keep up with GDP 
growth; $1 trillion 
should be added to 
realize the UN 
SDGs.50 
Globally, over $5 
trillion AUM is 
available each 
year.51 Infra-
structure 
investment could 
double from 2016 
to 2030.52 
$5.5 trillion 
spending gap 
between 2017 
and 2035.53 
(cont’d on next page) 
46 Id. at 20. 
47 Id. 
48 Daniel Wiener & Nathanael Didillon, Financing Sustainable and Resilient 
Infrastructure by Creating a New Asset Class for Institutional Investors, GLOB. 
INFRASTRUCTURE BASEL FOUND. 8 (June 2016), http://www.gib-foundation.org/content/ 
uploads/2014/03/Financing_Sustainable_and_Resilient_Infrastructure_GIB.pdf. 
49 Nicklas Garemo et al., The Infrastructure Conundrum: Improving Productivity, 
MCKINSEY & CO. (July 2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-
infrastructure/our-insights/the-infrastructure-conundrum-improving-productivity. 
50 Woetzel et al., supra note 43, at 2. 
51 Tyler Duvall et al., Making the Most of a Wealth of Infrastructure Finance, 
MCKINSEY & CO. (June 2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-
infrastructure/our-insights/making-the-most-of-a-wealth-of-infrastructure-finance.  
52 Sriram Changali, Azam Mohammad & Mark van Nieuwland, The Construction 
Productivity Imperative: How to Build Megaprojects Better, MCKINSEY & CO. (June 2015), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-infrastructure/our-insights/the-
construction-productivity-imperative. 
53 Woetzel et al., supra note 43, at 5. 
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Initiative 
Financing Needs 
for Infrastructure 
Supply of 
Investments 
Investment 
Gap 
New Climate 
Economy 
(NCE) 
Demand for $93 
trillion from 2015 to 
2030 or $6.4 trillion a 
year.54 
$6.4 trillion a year 
from 2015 until 
2030.55 
The gap is 
even larger, 
considering a 
low-carbon 
scenario. 
B2056 $60–70 trillion by 
2030. 
$45 trillion 
already available 
to invest. 
$15–20 
trillion. 
G20 “Global 
Infrastructure 
Hub” (GIB)57 
$94 trillion by 2040. $79 trillion 
investment current 
trends.58 
Investment 
gap of $15 
trillion by 
2040. 
UNEP59 Demand for $93 
trillion from 2016 to 
2030. 
Private 
Investment:  
$1–1.5 trillion a 
year; Public 
spending: $1.5 
trillion a year.60  
The gap is 
$39–51 
trillion; 
Shortfall of 
$2.5–3.5 
trillion a year 
by 2030. 
Using the 70% “rule of thumb,” the need for an economy’s GDP to 
remain at a fundamental level is approximately $2.6 trillion in 2013, 
54 THE NEW CLIMATE ECON. (NCE), INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT NEEDS OF A LOW-
CARBON SCENARIO 3 (Nov. 2014), https://newclimateeconomy.report/workingpapers/wp-
content/uploads/sites/5/2016/04/Infrastructure-investment-needs-of-a-low-carbon-
scenario.pdf. 
55 Id. 
56 B20 INFRASTRUCTURE & INVESTMENT TASKFORCE POLICY SUMMARY 3 (July 2014), 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/b20/B20-2014-infrastructure-recs.pdf. 
57 Global Infrastructure Hub, Forecasting Infrastructure Investment Needs and Gaps, 
GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE HUB, https://outlook.gihub.org/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2019). 
58 “Current trends” means growth calculated only in accordance with changes in every 
country’s economic and demographic fundamental data. 
59 The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Sustainable Infrastructure 
and Finance: How to Contribute to a Sustainable Future 9 (U.N. Env’t Prog. Inquiry 
Working Paper 16/09, 2016), http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/7756/ 
-Sustainable_infrastructure_and_finance_-_How_to_contribute_to_a_sustainable_future-
2016Sustainable_Infrastructure_and_Finance_-_How_to_Contribute_to_.pdf?sequence=3
&isAllowed=y.
60 Id. at 11. 
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$3.0–3.5 trillion by 2020, and $4.1–4.8 trillion by 2030.61 The world’s 
infrastructure investment needs from 2015 to 2030 are between $57 and 
$93 trillion. The world needs to invest $3.3 trillion per year, or $49 
trillion from 2016 to 2030, to keep pace with the projected average 
economic growth rate of 3.3% of global GDP.62  
In addition, the OECD’s estimation indicates that the world will 
spend $6.3 trillion a year from 2016 to 2030, including $4.9 trillion 
on “core infrastructure” and $1.4 trillion on primary energy supply 
chain and energy demand.63 However, a study conducted by PwC and 
Oxford Economics indicates that the world will spend over $9 trillion 
per year on infrastructure by 2025.64 Although the abovementioned 
organizations make different predictions based on their own criteria, 
the consensus is that the infrastructure investment needs in the next one 
or two decades are increasing, and the expectation that the world will 
spend enough money on improving infrastructure is optimistic.  
Considering the climate-adjusted factor (CAF),65 the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that investment will need to shift 
toward climate-friendly technologies in the global energy industry by 
at least $150 billion per year by 2020.66 Furthermore, countries in the 
East Asia and Pacific (EAP) Region will have an investment shortage 
of up to $80 billion.67  
61 RICHARD DOBBS ET AL., INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTIVITY: HOW TO SAVE  
$1 TRILLION A YEAR, MCKINSEY & CO. 4 (Jan. 2013), https://www.mckinsey.com/~ 
/media/McKinsey/Industries/Capital%20Projects%20and%20Infrastructure/Our%20Insigh
ts/Infrastructure%20productivity/MGI%20Infrastructure_Full%20report_Jan%202013.ashx. 
62 Jonathan Woetzel et al., Bridging Global Infrastructure Gaps, MCKINSEY &  
CO. 5 (June 2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Capital%20 
Projects%20and%20Infrastructure/Our%20Insights/Infrastructure%20productivity/MGI%
20Infrastructure_Full%20report_Jan%202013.ashx. 
63 MARIANA MIRABILE ET AL., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., TECHNICAL 
NOTE ON ESTIMATES OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT NEEDS: BACKGROUND NOTE ON 
ESTIMATES OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT NEEDS 6 (July 2017), https://www.oecd. 
org/env/cc/g20-climate/Technical-note-estimates-of-infrastructure-investment-needs.pdf. 
64 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, CAPITAL PROJECT AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
SPENDING: OUTLOOK TO 2025, at 7 (2014), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/capital-projects-
infrastructure/publications/cpi-outlook/assets/cpi-outlook-to-2025.pdf. 
65 The climate-adjusted factor (CAF) includes climate mitigation and climate proofing 
costs. When climate-related adjustments are counted, the infrastructure investment gap 
becomes larger. 
66 WORLD BANK, GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE: FRAMEWORK REPORT 7 (2012), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/343711468343734503/pdf/684910PUB0EPI00
67926B09780821395271.pdf. 
67 Id. 
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However, there is an imbalance between supply and demand on the 
Asian infrastructure market. For example, China and Japan have 
heavily invested in the regional infrastructure.68 And, Singapore has the 
finest infrastructure in the world.69 But many developing countries in 
Asia have underinvested in infrastructure, while the investment gap 
between supply and demand has widened. There is also an imbalance 
of financial feasibility between developing countries and developed 
countries. Globally, there are $120 trillion in assets held by banks and 
institutional investors, but 87% of the $120 trillion is ultimately owned 
(directly or indirectly) by developed countries.70  
In Asia, the annual infrastructure investment gap from 2016 to 2020 
is projected to be between $330 billion (baseline) and $460 billion in a 
climate-adjusted scenario.71 Considering the climate-adjusted factor, 
China’s overall investment gap is 1.2% of its GDP until 2020 due to 
China’s uneven infrastructure development between inland and coastal 
zones; Asia’s climate-adjusted investment gap (except the People’s 
Republic of China) would be 5% of the remaining economies’ GDP.72  
C. Competing Development Visions
In 2013, China proposed a multitrillion-dollar program—the “One 
Belt, One Road” (OBOR) program (also called the “Belt and Road” 
Initiative). The China-led OBOR program may partially fill the 
infrastructure finance gap between supply and demand.73 However, the 
OBOR program has its own objectives of exporting overcapacity, soft 
power, and renminbi internationalization. China has invested around 
68 Bloomberg, Japan Still Leads in Southeast Asia Infrastructure Race, Even as 
China Ramps up Belt and Road Investments: Report, S. CHINA MORNING POST (June 23, 
2019), https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3015732/japan-still-leads-
southeast-asia-infrastructure-race-even. 
69 Reuters, Singapore Has the Best Infrastructure in the World: Survey, BUS. TIMES, 
(Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/singapore-has-
the-best-infrastructure-in-the-world-survey. 
70 Woetzel et al., supra note 62, at viii. 
71 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, MEETING ASIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS: 
HIGHLIGHTS, at xv (2017), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/227496/ 
special-report-infrastructure.pdf. 
72 Id. 
73 See Alicia García-Herrero, China Can’t Finance the Belt and the Road Alone, 
BRUEGEL (May 12, 2017), https://bruegel.org/2017/05/china-cannot-finance-the-belt-and-
road-alone/. 
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$1 trillion in the OBOR initiative.74 Some estimations of the OBOR 
investment range between $1 trillion and $8 trillion—a wide range of 
estimates due to the lack of transparency in this mega-program.75 
Yet, OBOR goes beyond the scope of the Silk Road Economic Belt 
(SREB) and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR). Historically, China has 
been a continental power. China pursued a “maritime rising”— 
by guaranteeing access to its “near seas” periphery to expand to the 
“far seas”—and became a sea power after an economic boom. The 
dominant paradigm of Chinese elites is that being a sea power is a step 
toward becoming a global power.76 The new “Silk Road” program aims 
to build or to participate in financing port development projects. By 
July 2018, China invested in forty-two overseas ports in thirty-four 
countries as part of the OBOR program.77 OBOR also targets 
facilitating mega-connectivity through railways and roads, information 
and communications technology (ICT) projects, and special economic 
zones.78 Over sixty countries joined the OBOR program, including 
eight South Asian countries, eleven Southeast Asian countries, five 
Central Asian countries, sixteen West Asian and North African 
countries, sixteen Central Asian countries, six countries of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as well as Mongolia and 
Russia.79  
Around the world, there are competing visions of development 
strategies. Globally, the G20 established the Global Infrastructure (GI) 
Hub,80 and other institutions have proposed the Global Infrastructure 
74 Jane Perlez & Yufan Huang, Behind China’s $1 Trillion Plan to Shake Up the 
Economic Order, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/ 
business/china-railway-one-belt-one-road-1-trillion-plan.html. 
75 Jonathan E. Hillman, How Big Is China’s Belt and Road?, Commentary for CTR. FOR 
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-big-chinas-
belt-and-road. 
76 See generally TOSHI YOSHIHARA & JAMES R. HOLMES, RED STAR OVER THE PACIFIC: 
CHINA’S RISE AND THE CHALLENGE TO U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY (2013). 
77 Janne Suokas, China Invests in 42 Overseas Ports Under Belt and Road Project, GB 
TIMES (July 27, 2018), https://gbtimes.com/china-invests-in-42-overseas-ports-under-belt-
and-road-project. 
78 See THE ECONOMIST CORPORATE NETWORK, “ONE BELT, ONE ROAD”:  
AN ECONOMIC ROADMAP (March 2016), https://www.iberchina.org/files/2016/obor_ 
economist.pdf. 
79 TOP CHINA TRAVEL, supra note 23. 
80 The “Global Infrastructure (GI) Hub” is a G20 initiative to connect the global infra-
structure community. See About Global Infrastructure Hub, GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
HUB (last visited Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.gihub.org/about/about/.  
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Initiative (GII)81 and the Global Infrastructure Facility (GIF).82 
Regionally, ASEAN launched the “Master Plan on ASEAN 
Connectivity 2025”; Africa has the “Silk Road” program; and the 
European Union has the “Trans-European Transport Network.” At the 
national level, China initiated the BRI, and Japan proposed the 
“Partnership for High Quality Infrastructure.” If these development 
visions are cooperative, there can be many belts and roads as a regional 
or international public good.  
On the other hand, competition exists between some development 
strategies. Accompanying the looming “Economic Iron Curtain,”83 
there is a game of chess between China and the United States. Based 
on concerns such as human rights, debt sustainability, environmental 
protection, and the governance of the BRI, the Trump administration 
has proposed the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP). The 
FOIP, to some extent as a countermeasure against the BRI, pursues 
free, fair, and reciprocal trade.84 According to Vice President Pence, 
the Indo-Pacific region ranges broadly “from the United States to India, 
from Japan to Australia, and everywhere in between—where 
sovereignty is respected, where commerce flows unhindered and where 
independent nations are masters of their own destinies.”85 This strategy 
rests on three pillars: (1) “prosperity,” which covers two-thirds of the 
global trade valued at more than $1.8 trillion each year ($1 trillion from 
the U.S. and the rest from other economic sources); (2) “security,” 
which is the foundation of the first pillar and includes military support 
81 The “Global Infrastructure Initiative (GII)” is convened by McKinsey & Company for 
major projects and infrastructure. See Welcome to GII, GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
INITIATIVE, https://www.globalinfrastructureinitiative.com/about (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
82 The “Global Infrastructure Facility” (GIF) is a partnership to support bankable 
infrastructure projects in design, preparation, structuring, technical assistance, and 
implementation. Its funding partners, including governments, global financiers and private 
sector investors, provide financial contributions to the operation of GIF. See What Is the 
GIF?, GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITY, https://www.globalinfrafacility.org/what-is-
the-gif (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
83 Enda Curran, Paulson Warns of ‘Economic Iron Curtain’ Between U.S., China, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-07/paulson 
-warns-of-economic-iron-curtain-between-u-s-china.
84 DEPT. OF DEF., INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGIC REPORT: PREPARATION, PARTNERSHIP,
AND PROMOTING A NETWORKED REGION 3–4 (June 1, 2019), https://media.defense.gov/
2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-
STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF.
85 Mike Pence, The United States Seeks Collaboration, Not Control in the Indo-Pacific,
WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mike-pence-the-
united-states-seeks-collaboration-not-control-in-the-indo-pacific/2018/11/09/1a0c330a-
e45a-11e8-b7593d88a5ce9e19story.html?noredirect=on&utm term=.1943bf33560d.
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and protection of free navigation and overflight; and (3) collaboration 
and accountability to “support transparent and responsive government, 
the rule of law and the protection of individual rights.”86 Additionally, 
the United States issued the Better Utilization of Investments 
Leading to Development Act of 2018 and established the United 
States International Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC) as a 
successor of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). The 
Build Act of 2019 and the USIDFC are committed to promoting private 
investment in regional infrastructure and assisting economic 
development, especially in less developed countries. 
As many international experts have noticed, the FOIP strategy and 
the BRI are competing development strategies.87 The competition 
between the two major development strategies will reshape global 
development and disrupt the international economic order. 
II 
OBOR’S OPPORTUNITIES 
A. The OBOR Program as a Regional Public Good
At the Belt and Road Forum in May 2017, President Xi described 
OBOR as an open and inclusive “brand of cooperation” and an 
international public good provided by all participants; he also stressed 
that OBOR was open to all.88 OBOR is a multitrillion-dollar program. 
By January 2017, China announced investments of more than $900 
billion (including planned and ongoing investments) in more than sixty 
countries.89 During the 2017 APEC CEO Summit, President Xi 
announced China’s economic plan for the next fifteen years: import 
$24 trillion worth of goods, invest $2 trillion outbound, and attract 
$2 trillion inbound.90  
Generally, good infrastructure improves productivity, although the 
exact relationship between infrastructure, development, and economic 
86 Id. 
87 See TOMOTAKA SHOJI, “BELT AND ROAD” VS. “FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC”: 
COMPETITION OVER REGIONAL ORDER AND ASEAN, (Jan. 9, 2019), http://www.nids.mod. 
go.jp/english/publication/commentary/pdf/commentary088e.pdf. 
88 Ju Peng, Xi Elaborates on Inspiration Behind Belt and Road Initiative, XINHUA NET 
(May 15, 2017), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/15/c_136285408.htm. 
89 See Don Weinland, China Warned of Risk to Banks from One Belt, One Road 
Initiative, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/6076cf9a-e38e-11e6-
8405-9e5580d6e5fb. 
90 Xi Jinping, Pres. of China, Address at the APEC CEO Summit (Nov. 11, 2017) 
(transcript available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/11/c_136743492.htm).  
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growth is under debate. According to the World Bank, an increase of 
1% in the stock of infrastructure corresponds with an increase of 1% in 
GDP.91 This association is clear especially in the early stage of 
emerging markets. For example, China invested 1.3% of its annual 
Gross National Product (GNP) in updating transportation infrastructure 
during the 1980s and achieved an annual growth of around 8% for 
freight and 12% for passengers in transport expansion.92 Thus, 
infrastructure matters in boosting economic growth. 
B. Infrastructure, Trade, and Economic Growth
There is an endogenous relationship between economic growth and 
infrastructure investment.93 For example, ICT improvement increases 
trade flows.94 The Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) issued a 
working paper on how infrastructure affected trade and economic 
growth in ASEAN, China, India, Japan, and South Korea. That paper 
analyzed the relationship between transport, ICT, soft infrastructure, 
and trade flows; see Table 2. 
91 WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994: INFRASTRUCTURE FOR 
DEVELOPMENT 2 (1994), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/ 
5977/WDR%201994%20-%20English.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y. 
92 Id. at 18. 
93 Jani Luoto, Aggregate Infrastructure Capital Stock and Long-Run Growth: Evidence 
from Finish Data, 94 J. DEV. ECON. 181, 191 (2010); Abouzar Zangoueinezhad & Adel 
Azar, How Public-Private Partnership Projects Impact Infrastructure Industry for 
Economic Growth, 41 INT’L J. SOC. ECON. 99 (2014). 
94 Zhongwei Xing, The Impacts of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
and E-Commerce on Bilateral Trade Flows, 15 INT’L ECON. & ECON. POL’Y. 565 (July 
2018).  
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Table 2. Infrastructure, Trade Flows, and Economic Growth 
Coefficiency Between 
Infrastructure and 
Trade Flows 
Examples and 
Specific Effects 
Transport 
Infrastructure 
and Trade Flows 
Improvement in road and 
port infrastructures 
positively affects trade in 
both exporting and 
importing economies. 
E.g., an increase of 10%
in road density brings a
1% increase in trade.95
Information and 
Communications 
Technology  
(ICT) 
The increase of ICT 
infrastructure brings an 
increase of 0.5%–0.9% of 
GDP for exporters and 
0.4%–0.6% for importers.96 
E.g., a 10% increase in
the number of telephone
lines and cell phones
brings over 1%
economic growth.97
Soft 
Infrastructure 
Simplifying administrative 
procedures helps reduce 5% 
of time to export and 
increase imports by 4%.98 
E.g., a 10% increase in
the amount of required
documentation for
exports decreases trade
by 5.5%.
Agriculture and 
Manufacturing 
Export 
Airports and container port 
traffic affect manufacturing 
export significantly. Road 
infrastructure affects 
agricultural exports. 
E.g., a 10% increase in
transport infrastructure,
such as paved road, may
result in over 5%
economic growth.
Infrastructure 
and Trade 
Improved infrastructure 
facilitates trade between 
Asian countries. 
E.g., intra-Asia trade
increased by over 200%
from 2003 to 2013 due
to reduced trade costs
created by improved
infrastructure.
Infrastructure 
and Economic 
Growth 
Quantity-related transport 
infrastructure has a 
coefficient of 5% or more; 
however, merely increasing 
the quantity of infrastructure 
may not lead to sustainable 
development. 
E.g., a 10% increase in
the quantity of roads
creates over 5% in
economic growth.
95 Normaz Wana Ismail & Jamilah Mohd Mahyideen, The Impact of Infrastructure on 
Trade and Economic Growth in Selected Economies in Asia 16 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst. 
Working Paper No. 553, 2015), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/177093/ 
adbi-wp553.pdf. 
96 Id. at 18. 
97 Id. at 25. 
98 Id. at 21. 
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The ADBI working paper concludes that although the quality and 
quantity of infrastructure are equally important, enhancing the quantity 
of infrastructure promotes economic growth, whereas enhancing the 
quality of infrastructure leads to increased productivity and sustainable 
development.99 This research suggests that infrastructure development 
promotes trade expansion and regional integration.  
C. Quality Infrastructure and Strategic Infrastructure
In 2017, the OECD set a framework for infrastructure governance. 
After surveying twenty-five countries, the OECD report listed ten 
governance challenges: vision, integrity, delivery, regulation, 
consultation, coordination, value, data, performance, and resilience.100  
The definition of “quality infrastructure” evolves with advances in 
technology.101 Quality infrastructure is supposed to use the best 
available technology to pursue reliable and resilient development in 
line with international safeguards and standards of environment, 
society, and governance (ESG).102 Furthermore, quality infrastructure 
should optimize an efficient value chain in the flow of project 
preparation, design, construction, implementation, and maintenance.  
Strategically developing infrastructure stimulates economic growth 
and sustainable development.103 Some developing countries in Asia 
are still building basic infrastructure.104 Although both quality 
infrastructure and basic infrastructure play an essential role in the 
economic growth of emerging economies and developing countries, 
99 Id. at 26. 
100 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., GETTING INFRASTRUCTURE RIGHT: 
THE TEN KEY GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES AND POLICY OPTIONS (March 2017), 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/getting-infrastructure-right.pdf. 
101 Daniel F. Runde, Quality Infrastructure: Ensure Sustainable Economic Growth, 
CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.csis.org/analysis/quality-
infrastructure. 
102 Id. 
103 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP & WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, STRATEGIC 
INFRASTRUCTURE – STEPS TO PRIORITIZE AND DELIVER INFRASTRUCTURE EFFECTIVELY 
AND EFFICIENTLY 2 (Sept. 2012), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_IU_Strategic 
Infrastructure_Report_2012.pdf. 
104 CANDICE BRANCHOUX ET AL., ESTIMATING INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING NEEDS 
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, LANDLOCKED DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES, AND SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES (2018), https://www.mdpi.com/ 
2227-7099/6/3/43. 
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quality infrastructure matters more for sustainable development.105 
Strategic infrastructure helps improve investment efficiency. 
D. Spillover Effects of Infrastructure and Development Strategy
Infrastructure facilitates trade.106 Generally, developing quality
infrastructure improves productivity.107 According to the World Bank, 
a 1% increase in the stock of infrastructure corresponds with a 1% 
increase in GDP.108 Returns on infrastructure investment in boosting 
economic growth is clear, especially during the early stages of 
emerging markets, such as in China and India.109 
Research shows that investments in transportation infrastructure, 
prior to the global financial crisis, played a positive role in China’s 
economic growth. Provincial panel data from 1993 to 2004 showed that 
investments in transportation infrastructure affected China’s economic 
growth.110 Other research conducted in 2011 showed that investments 
in both land and water transportation infrastructure significantly 
affected economic growth based on data from all thirty-one provinces 
between 1998 and 2007.111 Additionally, panel data from 1999 to 2009 
indicated that port investments by central and local governments also 
affected economic growth.112  
The positive effects created by developing infrastructure are not 
absolute, however, as poorly managed infrastructure investments can 
negatively affect economic growth. Evidence from Africa serves as 
105 Strategic infrastructure key to ensure the economic and social infrastructure needed 
to accommodate population growth. Quality infrastructure (QI) is regarded as a drive to 
boost economic growth. Unlike quality infrastructure, strategic infrastructure provides 
necessary physical infrastructure in a country or state.  
106 Teddy Y. Soobramanien & Collin Zhuawu, Infrastructure for Trade Development, 
TRADE HOT TOPICS 1 (March 1, 2014), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/5jz5m7 
pkrqf8-en.pdf?expires=1571076894&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=10F1DA3E4524 
1D04BE18DFEA1C9785F2. 
107 See Nicklas Garemo et al., The Infrastructure Conundrum: Improving Productivity, 
MCKINSEY & CO. (July 2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-
infrastructure/our-insights/the-infrastructure-conundrum-improving-productivity. 
108 WORLD BANK, supra note 91. 
109 Jonathan Wheatley, Does Investing in Emerging Markets Still Make Sense?, FIN. 
TIMES (July 15, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/0bd159f2-937b-11e9-aea1-2b1d33ac3271.  
110 Xueliang Zhang, Transport Infrastructure, Spatial Spillover and Economic Growth: 
Evidence from China, 3 FRONTIERS ECON. CHINA 595, 597 (2008). 
111 Junjie Hong et al., Transport Infrastructure and Regional Economic Growth: 
Evidence from China, 38 TRANSP. 737, 750 (2011).  
112 Lili Song & Jianing Mi, Port Infrastructure and Regional Economic Growth in 
China: A Granger Causality Analysis, 43 MAR. POL’Y & MGMT 456 (2016). 
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an example. Unlike East and South Asia’s experience, where 
infrastructure development contributed to higher growth and lower 
inequality, infrastructure development in sub-Saharan Africa did 
not stimulate inclusive economic development due to inadequate 
infrastructure and corruption.113 Even for many Asian countries, which 
have made progress in construction and growth, other components such 
as economic transformation and innovation play a key role in economic 
development; otherwise, these countries may fall into the “middle-
income trap.”114  
In addition, spending too much on infrastructure can negatively 
affect long-term economic development. For example, between 1992 
and 2011, China spent approximately 9% of its GDP annually on 
construction infrastructure (e.g., transportation, water, power, and 
telecommunications) alone.115 Even though investing in infrastructure 
(including residential infrastructure) is the most important engine 
driving the economy, especially after the global financial crisis, the 
infrastructure-driven approach can create a heavy burden of debt.  
E. Enhancing Connectivity and Regional Integration
Constructing railroads, highways, information and communication 
technology (ICT) projects, and special economic zones helps create 
mega-connectivity.116 The OBOR initiative aims to enhance 
connectivity by constructing highways, railroads, ports, cables, 
pipelines, and other transportation. China signed memorandums with 
more than forty countries to jointly construct the “One Belt, One Road” 
project. By the end of 2015, China built 19,000 kilometers of high-
speed railroads, which is the world’s largest rail network; in addition, 
China plans to build another 30,000 kilometers by 2020.117  
The BRI may also enhance people-to-people connectivity. China 
expects to establish goodwill with other countries and cultivate an 
113 See Olu Ajakaiye & Mthuli Ncube, Infrastructure and Economic Development in 
Africa: An Overview, 19 AFR. ECONOMIES J., at i3, i7 (2010). 
114 MILKEN INST., NEW MODELS FOR FINANCING INFRASTRUCTURE IN ASIA 3 (2017), 
http://milkeninstitute.org/reports/new-models-financing-infrastructure-asia. 
115 Ian Talley, U.S. Looks to Work with China-Led Infrastructure Fund, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 22, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-seek-collaboration-with-china-led-
asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-1427057486.  
116 See WORLD BANK ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATIONAL USE OF INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES IN AFRICA 13–14 (Enock Yonazi et al. eds., 2012).  
117 Reuters, China to Increase High-Speed Rail Network to 30,000 km by 2020, INDIA 
EXPRESS (Apr. 21, 2016), http://indianexpress.com/article/business/business-others/china-
to-increase-high-speed-rail-network-to-30000-km-by-2020/. 
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enlarging “circle of friends.” On the other hand, as many observers 
have noticed, the BRI is China-centered. Some countries are concerned 
about the benefits from the OBOR project because the gains may be 
lopsided. For instance, Pakistan, Nepal, and Myanmar canceled the 
$14 billion dollar Diamer-Bhasha Dam project. There, Myanmar 
announced that it was no longer interested in big hydroelectric power 
projects.118 
III  
OBOR’S RISKS 
A. Political and Geopolitical Risks
Political risks include factors such as political stability, government 
effectiveness, rule of law, democratic accountability, corruption, and 
the nationalization of the military. Many countries associated with 
OBOR pose significant political risks, especially those in the Middle 
East and Central Asia, according to the Regional Political Risk 
Index,119 Marsh Political Risk Index Map,120 New Coface Political Risk 
Index,121 and Corruption Perceptions Index.122  
Infrastructure investments in OBOR countries that pose significant 
political risks are vulnerable to nationalization, expropriation, and 
other takings. For instance, a host country may nationalize or privatize 
public infrastructure, although nationalization occurs more often in 
118 Saibal Dasgupta & Anjana Pasricha, Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar Back Away 
From Chinese Projects, VOA (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.voanews.com/a/three-countries-
withdraw-from-chinese-projects/4148094.html. 
119 “Regional Political Risk Index” measures overall risk of a given country by 
calculating 17 risk components, such as turmoil, financial transfer, direct investment, and 
export. It is developed by the PRS Group, Inc. See PRS GROUP, REGIONAL POLITICAL RISK 
INDEX, https://www.prsgroup.com/regional-political-risk-index-4/ (last visited Nov. 7, 
2019).  
120 “Marsh Political Risk Index Map” provides a global view on analyzing political, 
economic, financial, and industry risks, based upon data from Fitch Solutions. See MARSH, 
POLITICAL RISK MAP 2019, https://www.marsh.com/us/campaigns/political-risk-map-
2019.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).  
121 “New Coface Political Risk Index” is a global index to measure security risks and 
political and social risks of 159 countries. See NEW COFACE POLITICAL RISK INDEX IN  
159 COUNTRIES, https://www.coface.com/News-Publications/News/New-Coface-Political-
Risk-Index-in-159-countries (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).  
122 “Corruption Perceptions Index” is published annually by Transparency International. 
It ranks 180 countries and territories on a scale from 0 to 100 regarding public sector 
corruption. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2018, 
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).  
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developing countries and emerging economies.123 In a host country 
with weak investor protection regimes, confiscation and expropriation 
of funds occur frequently.124 Creeping expropriations such as 
discriminatory taxes, price controls, license cancellation, or changes of 
law disrupt infrastructure investments.125 Investment returns may also 
suffer from sovereign risk or transfer risk when capital is frozen by 
foreign government action or new policies.126  
Infrastructure investments are also vulnerable to geopolitical events 
such as international conflicts, power shifts, policy shifts, political 
instability, social unrest, and political interventions. Politically 
unstable countries, especially, magnify these risks. Political turmoil in 
countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon can 
directly or indirectly affect foreign direct investment (FDI). Yet, the 
BRI is not backed by an investment insurance facility like the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) to mitigate 
political risks in developing countries.127  
The Myitsone Dam project in Myanmar illustrates how political 
risks affect infrastructure investments. The Myitsone Dam was 
supposed to be the first dam developed by the State Power Investment 
Corporation, one of China’s largest electricity manufacturers.128 The 
contract price of the dam was $3.6 billion, under which Myanmar 
would receive 10% of its electricity for free for fifty concessional 
123 ROBERTO CHANG, CONSTANTINO HEVIA & NORMAN LOAYZA, PRIVATIZATION AND 
NATIONALIZATION CYCLES (2009).  
124 See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Expropriation: UNCTAD Series 
on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, 73–76, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/7 
(2011), https://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf. 
125 Id. at 11 (defining creeping expropriation as “the incremental encroachment on one 
or more of the ownership rights of a foreign investor that eventually destroys (or nearly 
destroys) the value of his or her investment or deprives him or her of control over the 
investment”).  
126 Duncan H. Meldrum, Country Risk and Foreign Direct Investment, SEMANTIC 
SCHOLAR 3, 5, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b9c7/07006061547267100bf9b411a3aa 
951f3111.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2019).  
127 MIGA provides political risk insurance against losses caused by currency 
inconvertibility and transfer restrictions in the host country. MIGA is one of the five 
organizations of the World Bank Group. See About Us, MULTILATERAL INV. GUARANTEE 
AGENCY, https://www.miga.org/about-us (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).  
128 The State Power Investment Corporation (founded in December 2002) was one of 
the five largest state-owned electricity producers in China. The other four are China 
Huaneng, Datang, Huadian, and China Guodian Corporation. 
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periods, then full ownership of the dam fifty years later.129 Asia World, 
which is subject to sanctions due to involvement in drug dealings, 
owned 5% of the project. The project, however, was suspended in 2011 
by Myanmar’s former military government due to public opposition 
and environmental issues.130 China insisted that the contract was still 
valid and pushed the Burmese government to resume the project. Now, 
the decision to resume may be a dilemma for the special committee led 
by the leader of Myanmar’s civilian government, Daw Aung San Suu 
Kyi.131 If the committee resumes this project, Suu Kyi will upset those 
who protested this project, including some NGOs. If the commission 
declines to resume the Myitsone Dam project, Myanmar—in addition 
to possibly angering China, its largest trade partner—will have to pay 
the State Power Investment Corporation $800,000,000 and any other 
amounts stemming from cancellation, which the developer claims is 
around ¥300,000,00. However, the parties involved in the project could 
possibly compromise by, for example, agreeing to build a smaller 
hydropower plant with less environmental impact.132 
The Myitsone Dam project should remind Chinese decision makers 
of the various political risks associated with BRI projects. As a 
practical long-term investment consideration to attract private 
investors, a political risk insurance system is necessary to protect 
against situations such as sovereign debt default, political violence, 
expropriation, terrorism, and other political turbulence. 
More importantly, the BRI may substantially change the balance of 
power in the region, in addition to challenging the development 
strategies established by the World Bank Group and other development 
institutions.  
B. Economic Risks
Like any other investment, investors should consider the inherent 
economic risks, such as inflation, price fluctuations, demand, cash 
flow, taxes, and operational risks involving design, construction, 
129 Mike Ives, A Chinese-Backed Dam Project Leaves Myanmar in a Bind, N.Y.  
TIMES (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/world/asia/myanmar-china-
myitsone-dam-project.html.  
130 Thomas Fuller, Myanmar Backs Down, Suspending Dam Project, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 30, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/asia/myanmar-suspends-
construction-of-controversial-dam.html.  
131 Ives, supra note 129. 
132 Id. 
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maintenance, cost, and management. However, these risks should 
already be calculated into the project’s cost. 
Infrastructure projects are normally conducted in three phases: 
(i) building or construction, (ii) operation, and (iii) transfer.133 The
operation, maintenance, and management of an infrastructure project
may affect its returns. Generally, operation and maintenance costs
account for half of the expenditures for an infrastructure project.
Particularly inadequate management and maintenance in developing
countries will quickly deteriorate railways, bridges, highways, and
other infrastructure.134 For example, the deteriorating railways and
roads in Bangladesh are a serious problem for local transportation, for
which the ADB created a road master plan and long-term railway
investment program for the country.135 Another example is the Coca
Codo Sinclair Hydroelectric Dam in Ecuador, which began operation
in 2016.136 More than 7,648 cracks were found in the dam’s machinery
two years after operation began, due to substandard steel and
inadequate welding.137 The dam also faces other problems, such as sand
and silt clogs, abrupt earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions.138 These
examples indicate that quality infrastructure is essential for sustainable
development.
C. Legal and Regulatory Risks
Legal risks of the OBOR project concern the fairness, speediness, 
and effectiveness of the judicial system; enforceability of contracts; 
discrimination against foreign companies; antitrust and unfair 
competition; lack of safeguards for intellectual and other property; and 
133 The Economist Intelligence Unit’s risk assessment report assesses the operational, 
security credit, and sovereign risks of a project in a host country. See generally ECONOMIST 
INTELLIGENCE UNIT, PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES ON CHINA’S ‘ONE BELT, ONE ROAD’: 
A RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT (2015), http://www.eiu.com/public/thankyou_download. 
aspx?activity=download&campaignid=OneBeltOneRoad.  
134 See ASIAN DEV. BANK, ISSUES IN ROAD MAINTENANCE (2013), https://www.adb. 
org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/Issues-Road-Maintenance.pdf.  
135 ASIAN DEV. BANK, BANGLADESH: ROAD MAINTENANCE AND IMPROVEMENT 
PROJECT, at X (2014), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/in435-14.pdf. 
136 Coca Codo Sinclair Hydroelectric Project, POWER TECH., https://www.power-
technology.com/projects/coca-codo-sinclair-hydroelectric-project/ (last visited Nov. 7, 
2019).  
137 Nicholas Casey & Clifford Krauss, It Doesn’t Matter if Ecuador Can Afford This 
Dam. China Still Gets Paid., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
12/24/world/americas/ecuador-china-dam.html.  
138 Id. 
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the integrity of accounting standards.139 Generally speaking, regulatory 
risks concern changes in laws and regulations that affect a certain 
industry or market.140 Delays in acquiring necessary licenses or 
permits, stalled transfers of ownership, difficulties in acquiring land, 
contractual risks, and transparency of procurement procedures—all of 
which are legal or regulatory risks—may disrupt infrastructure 
projects.141  
In particular, infrastructure projects and the construction industry 
may be susceptible to corruption. Corruption can occur at any stage 
of an infrastructure project, from design, construction, and operation, 
to transfer or privatization of infrastructure.142 The OECD’s survey 
indicates that about 40% of foreign bribery cases occurred in three 
sectors: construction, transportation and storage, and information and 
communication.143 During the anti-corruption movement led by 
President Xi, 1.34 million officials, including 200 government officials 
of vice-ministerial rank and above, were punished by the 
commencement of the 19th Nation Party Congress in October 2017. 
The Chinese government announced it would continue to do so until 
“complete victory” was achieved.144 Even still, China is one of the more 
corrupt nations according to the TRACE Bribery Risk Matrix.145 
139 See generally O. O. Odimabo & C. F. Oduoza, Risk Assessment Framework for 
Building Construction Projects’ in Developing Countries, 2 INT’L J. OF CONSTRUCTION 
ENGINEERING AND MGMT. 143, 146 (2013).  
140 See STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE INITIATIVE & BOS. CONSULTING GRP., 
MITIGATION OF POLITICAL & REGULATORY RISK IN INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS (2015), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Risk_Mitigation_Report14.pdf. 
141 Michael Gibbs, Transferring Ownership from Developer to Utility, N. AM. WIND 
POWER (2009). 
142 See Jill Wells, Corruption in the Construction of Public Infrastructure: Critical 
Issues in Project Preparation, 8 U4 ISSUE 1 (2015), https://www.u4.no/publications/ 
corruption-in-the-construction-of-public-infrastructure-critical-issues-in-project-preparation.  
143 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., GETTING INFRASTRUCTURE RIGHT: 
THE TEN KEY GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES AND POLICY OPTIONS 3 (2017), 
https://www.oecd.org/gov/getting-infrastructure-right.pdf. 
144 Lim Yan Liang, 19th Party Congress: China to Strengthen Anti-graft Measures, 
Expand Party Supervision, STRAITS TIMES (Oct. 18, 2017), http://www.straitstimes.com/ 
asia/east-asia/19th-party-congress-anti-graft-campaign-has-overwhelming-momentum-
says-xi-jinping.  
145 See TRACE Bribery Risk Matrix, TRACE, https://www.traceinternational.org/trace-
matrix (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).  
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“In many of the 80-plus counties that the BRI aims to connect, 
corruption is endemic.”146 A research report shows that transparency of 
Chinese corporations ranked the lowest of the five BRICS countries.147 
Over the past few years, major cases concerning transnational bribery 
and transnational corruption, including the 1Malaysia Development 
Berhad (1MDB) scandal,148 the Patrick Ho Chi-Ping case,149 and the 
BTA Bank case,150 have revealed embezzlement, corruption, bribery, 
and money laundering along the Belt and Road. Additionally, most BRI 
countries rank in the bottom 50% of the TRACE Bribery Risk Matrix, 
and ten BRI countries rank among the twenty-five countries with the 
highest risk of serious corruption.151 
Corruption in BRI countries arises from the low level of the rule of 
law or a high level of kleptocracy.152 Many BRI countries, including 
Bangladesh, Ecuador, the Philippines, Malaysia, Equatorial Guinea, 
and Sri Lanka, are vulnerable to bribery and embezzlement.153 
Moreover, China ranks 82 out of 126 countries in the WJP Rule of Law 
146 Jonathan E. Hillman, Corruption Flows Along China’s Belt and Road, CTR. FOR 
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.csis.org/analysis/corruption-flows-
along-chinas-belt-and-road.  
147 “BRICS” refers to the national economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, TRANSPARENCY IN CORPORATE REPORTING: ACCESSING 
EMERGING MARKET MULTINATIONALS 34–39 (Susan Côté-Freeman ed., 2016), https:// 
issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/2016_transparencyincorporatereporti?e=249645
6/37122985. 
148 1MDB is Malaysia’s sovereign fund. That fund of over $4.2 billion was used 
in irregular transactions. Najib Razak, former Malaysian Prime Minister, who was liable 
for corruption and other criminal charges, was ousted in a general election in 2018. 
See Shamim Adam, et al., How Malaysia’s 1MDB Scandal Shook the Financial World, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/how-malaysias-
1mdb-scandal-shook-the-financial-world-quicktake/2019/08/28/f183b7c2-c95b-11e9-9615 
-8f1a32962e04_story.html.
149 United States v. Chi Ping Patrick Ho, No. 17 Cr. 779 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11,
2019). See also Press Release, Department of Justice, Patrick Ho, Former Head of
Organization Backed by Chinese Energy Conglomerate, Sentenced to 3 Years in Prison for
International Bribery and Money Laundering Offenses (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.
justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/patrick-ho-former-head-organization-backed-chinese-energy-
conglomerate-sentenced-3.
150 Paolo Sorbello, UK Court Slaps Huge Fine on Khrapunov in BTA Case, THE
DIPLOMAT (Sept. 24, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/uk-court-slaps-huge-fine-on-
khrapunov-in-bta-case/.
151 Will Doig, The Belt and Road Initiative Is a Corruption Bonanza, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Jan. 15, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/15/the-belt-and-road-initiative-
is-a-corruption-bonanza/.
152 Will Doig, Corruption Bonanza, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 15, 2019), https://
foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/15/the-belt-and-road-initiative-is-a-corruption-bonanza/.
153 DANIEL KLIMAN ET AL., GRADING CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD 6, 10 (2019),
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/beltandroad.
2020] The “One Belt, One Road” Initiative as 101 
Regional Public Good: Opportunities and Risks 
Index 2019.154 Rankings of other countries in the WJP Rule of Law 
Index 2019 and the TRACE Bribery Risk Matrix (2018) are as follows: 
Bangladesh  112 out of 126; 182 
Ecuador   87 out of 126; 136 
Equatorial Guinea 105 out of 126; 194 
Malaysia   51 out of 126;   63 
Philippines   90 out of 126; 100 
Sri Lanka   63 out of 126; 148 
These rankings account for the causal relation between the rule of law 
and corruption rate in the abovementioned countries. 
Moreover, Asian commercial arbitration organizations may have 
difficulty arbitrating conflicting interests between BRI countries. Thus, 
the enforcement of arbitration awards may be a problem because of the 
inadequate quality of the rule of law in some BRI countries. Therefore, 
developing an organization like the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) helps solve regional settlement of 
disputes.155  
D. Social and Environmental Risks
Assessing and managing social and environmental issues can be 
critical in infrastructure and energy projects. These issues include, but 
are not limited to, labor and working conditions, labor strikes, pollution 
prevention and abatement, demolition and relocation, biodiversity 
conservation and ecological protection, risks to indigenous people, and 
risks to cultural heritage.156 In January 2018, a Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) investigation indicated that 89% of 
contractors in Chinese-funded BRI transport projects in thirty-four 
countries were Chinese.157 Other studies show that the share of Chinese 
154 The World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index 2019 measures countries’ rule 
of law performance across eight factors: constraints on government powers, absence of 
corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory 
enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice. WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW 
INDEX 2019, at 6 (2019). 
155 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was set up in 
1966 by the World Bank Group (WBG) for investor-state dispute settlements in international 
investment. ICSID is one of the five organizations of WBG.  
156 See GLOB. REPORTING INITIATIVE, SUSTAINABILITY TOPICS FOR SECTORS: WHAT 
DO STAKEHOLDERS WANT TO KNOW? 21–31 (2013), https://www.globalreporting.org/ 
resourcelibrary/sustainability-topics.pdf. 
157 James Kynge, Chinese Contractors Grab Lion’s Share of Silk Road Projects, 
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companies in Chinese-funded BRI projects are substantially higher 
than the share of the host countries, ranging from 60% to 80%.158 
Policies focusing on sustainable infrastructural development may 
challenge environmental practices in developing countries. For 
example, the Paris Climate Agreement came into force on November 
4, 2016, and 170 parties have ratified it.159 Moreover, other rules, such 
as the UN Global Compact, UNEP Responsible Investment Principles, 
IFC Social and Environmental Sustainability Performance Standards, 
OECD Guidelines for Transnational Corporations, and the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative Plan, have also been implemented 
and must be followed. These internationally accepted rules may not 
apply in some developing countries or countries with low rule of law 
rankings. 
Sustainability, transparency, and inclusion have been a serious 
challenge for infrastructure governance of BRI projects.160 In 
2011, Myanmar suspended the $3.6 billion Myitsone Dam, a 6,000 
megawatts (MW) hydropower project with the State Power Investment 
Corporation, due to environmental issues and an uneven disbursement 
of electricity output between China’s Yunnan province and 
Myanmar.161 The dam project was finally canceled in 2018, and the 
suspension left Myanmar $800 million in debt to China.162 In another 
example, Pakistan rejected the $14 billion Diamer-Bhasha Dam project 
and requested that Beijing exclude it from the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC) framework in November 2017.163 The 
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/76b1be0c-0113-11e8-9650-
9c0ad2d7c5b5. 
158 Tania Ghossein et al., Public Procurement in the Belt and Road Initiative, WORLD 
BANK GROUP, MTI Discussion Paper No. 10, (Dec., 1 2018), http://documents.worldbank. 
org/curated/en/143241544213097139/Public-Procurement-in-the-Belt-and-Road-Initiative. 
159 Paris Agreement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Apr. 22, 2016, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 (entered into force Nov. 4, 2016).  
160 See Jamie P. Horsley, Challenging China to Make Good Project Governance a 
Centerpiece of the Belt and Road Initiative 4 (Dec. 2018) (unnumbered working paper) 
(on file with sponsoring organization), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/ 
china/document/horsley_china_bri-good_governance_infrastructure.pdf. 
161 Tom Fawthrop, Myanmar’s Myitsone Dam Dilemma, THE DIPLOMAT (Mar. 11, 
2019). 
162 Jeff Opperman, Following Dam Cancellation, Myanmar Can Lead on Sustainable 
Energy, FORBES (25 January 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffopperman/2018/01/ 
25/following-dam-cancellation-myanmar-can-lead-on-sustainable-energy/#3d2e01f22fbe. 
163 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, Pakistan Rejection of China’s Dam Aimed at Showing 
OBOR in Line with Global Rules, ECON. TIMES (July 12, 2018), https://economictimes. 
indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistan-rejection-of-chinas-dam-aimed-at-showing-obor-
in-line-with-global-rules/articleshow/61715963.cms. 
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original estimated project cost was $5 billion, but it later increased to 
$14 billion.164 The hydropower project was located in Pakistan-
occupied Kashmir (PoK), a disputed territory. As a result, it was 
difficult to secure funding.165 BRI projects, such as the Sri Lanka 
coastline development project and Coca Codo Sinclair Hydroelectric 
Dam in Ecuador, have also had a negative effect on the environment.166 
As a result of these negative environmental effects, many BRI 
projects have encountered a series of disruptions since late 2017. 
In November 2017, a few countries, including Pakistan, Nepal, and 
Myanmar, canceled a few hydropower projects with Chinese 
companies,167 whose value amounted to nearly $20 billion.168 For 
example, Nepal canceled the $2.5 billion Budhi Gandaki hydroelectric 
project in November 2017, which was signed by the former pro-Beijing 
government with China Gezhouba Group Corporation.169 Meanwhile, 
Nepal turned to India and permitted GMR Group and Satluj Jal Vidyut 
Nigam Limited to each build a 900-MW hydropower project.170  
IV 
OBOR’S FINANCIAL RISKS AND CASE STUDY 
For major investment projects like OBOR, economists and policy 
analysts typically examine a variety of financial risk factors.171 These 
factors range from debt sustainability, investment efficiency, 
macroeconomic projections, country classification and debt carrying 
capacity, to risk of external debt, overall risk of public debt, and 
financial risk ratings.172  
164 Id. 
165 Id.  
166 KLIMAN ET AL., supra note 153.  
167 See Dasgupta & Pasricha, supra note 118. 
168 Id. 
169 Gopal Sharma, Nepal Scraps $2.5 Bln Hydropower Plant Deal with Chinese 
Company, REUTERS (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/nepal-china-hydropower/ 
nepal-scraps-2-5-bln-hydropower-plant-deal-with-chinese-company-idUSL3N1NJ3HD. 
170 Id. 
171 Antonio J. Monroy Antón, Gema Sáez Rodríguez & Ángel Rodríguez López, 
Financial Risks in Construction Projects, 5 AFR. J. BUS. MGMT. 12,325 (Dec. 7, 2011).  
172 INT’L DEV. ASS’N, ADDRESSING DEBT VULNERABILITIES IN IDA COUNTRIES: 
OPTIONS FOR IDA19 (2019), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/296411555 
639304820/pdf/Debt-Vulnerabilities-in-IDA-Countries-Policy-Options-for-IDA19.pdf. 
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A. OBOR’s Financial Vehicles
China developed a series of financial vehicles for OBOR, including 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Silk Road Fund (SRF), 
and New Development Bank (NDB). Additionally, China’s policy 
banks, including the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-
Import Bank of China, and state-owned banks (such as Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Bank of China, 
and Agriculture Bank of China) are major lenders of various OBOR 
projects.173 China also organized quite a few intergovernmental 
investments, such as the China ASEAN Fund (CAF), the China Eurasia 
Cooperation Fund, the Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU), and the 
China-Africa Development Fund.174 
The AIIB was founded in December 2015 as a multilateral 
development bank.175 As of August 27, 2018, it had 44 regional 
members, 23 nonregional members, and 20 prospective members.176 
AIIB uses a three-tier governance structure, including the Board of 
Governors, the Board of Directors, and management.177 A majority of 
Governors representing not less than two-thirds of the total voting 
rights of the members shall be composed of a quorum for meetings of 
the Board of Governors.178 The Board of Directors and management 
such as the President, five Vice-Presidents, and Officers of the Bank 
are responsible for the general operation of the Bank. The AIIB does 
not have a residential Board of Directors.179  
173 Belt and Road News, Financing and Funding for the Belt & Road Initiative (May 17, 
2019), https://www.beltandroad.news/2019/05/17/financing-and-funding-for-the-belt-road-
initiative/. 
174 JIN SHENG, NAT’L UNIV. OF SING., CTR. FOR BANKING AND FIN. LAW, 
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF ‘ONE BELT, ONE ROAD’ INITIATIVE:  
AN EVOLUTION OR DEVOLUTION? 5 (2018), https://law.nus.edu.sg/cbfl/pdfs/reports/CBFL-
Rep-1806.pdf.  
175 AIIB, AIIB’s Charter Enters into Force on 25 December 2015 (Dec. 25, 2015), 
https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/news/2016/20160116_001.html. 
176 About AIIB, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INV. BANK, https://www.aiib.org/en (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2019).  
177 Natalie Lichtenstein, Governance of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 
Comparative Context, in AIIB YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 56 (2018), 
https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/who-we-are/yearbook/_download/governance-aiib-
comparative.pdf. 
178 AIIB, Articles of Agreement, art. 24.2, https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/basic-
documents/_download/articles-of-agreement/basic_document_english-bank_articles_of_ 
agreement.pdf [hereinafter AIIB Articles of Agreement]. 
179 Id. Article 27.1. 
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Under the AIIB’s Corporate Procurement Policy, there are four 
procurement methods: direct purchasing, competitive procurement 
(with eight exceptions stipulated in Article 7.3), framework 
agreements, and retroactive contracts.180 Direct purchasing applies to 
orders for goods and services estimated at less than $10,000, and direct 
purchasing can be issued by User Departments.181 Corporate 
Procurement is normally open to competitive tendering, subject to the 
Corporate Procurement Policy and the Directives.182 For all purchase 
orders and contracts estimated at $70,000 or more, a Technical 
Evaluation Committee (TEC) is required to evaluate the technical 
proposals.183 The AIIB can also use framework agreements to save 
delivery time.184  
In China’s OBOR strategy, the New Development Bank (NDB) is 
an important partner of the AIIB. In 2009, after the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC), the BRICS countries started to alter the global financial 
architecture, although the International Monetary Fund (IMF) finally 
made a major reform in January 2016 by increasing BRICS’ voting 
share to 14.7%, very close to a blocking share of 15%.185 To some 
extent, BRICS Bank’s purpose is to challenge the existing order of 
international financial institutions and act as a rival of the WBG and 
the IMF; however, NDB operates more slowly than AIIB.186 In April 
2016, the NDB issued its first set of loans, and, in July 2016, the NDB 
issued its first $448 million green bonds in China’s interbank bond 
market.187 These green bonds are yuan-denominated with a five-year 
tenor.188 The NDB also planned to lend $2.5 to $3 billion for projects 
180 AIIB, Corporate Procurement Policy, art. 7 (Jan. 2016), https://www.aiib.org/en/ 
policies-strategies/_download/corporate-procuremen-policy/corporate-procurement-
policy.pdf.  
181 Id. at art. 7.1. 
182 Id. at art. 7.2.2. 
183 Id. at art. 7.2.3. 
184 Id. at art. 7.4. 
185 See Klemens Witte, The BRICS: Building a New International Financial Order?, 
DOC RES. INST. (Sep. 6, 2017), https://doc-research.org/2017/09/brics-new-international-
financial-order. 
186 See Hongying Wang, The New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank: China’s Ambiguous Approach to Global Financial Governance, 50 DEV. 
AND CHANGE 221 (2019). 
187 BRICS Bank to Issue $448 Million of Yuan Green Bonds, NEW DEV. BANK (July 12, 
2016), https://www.ndb.int/media/brics-bank-issue-448-million-yuan-green-bonds. 
188 Id. 
106 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 21, 75 
in 2017.189 The possible loan portfolio of NDB will reach an estimated 
$45–65 billion, and the likely loan portfolio of the AIIB will reach an 
estimate close to Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)’s $120.4 
billion by 2025 respectively.190 This estimation indicates the AIIB will 
have a greater loan portfolio than the NDB and, as a result, a potentially 
greater operational scale than NDB.  
The NDB set up a self-managed Contingency Reserve Arrangement 
(CRA) of $100 billion in July 2014.191 The initial contributions of 
member states are as follows: China contributed $41 billion; Brazil, 
India, and Russia each contributed $18 billion; and South Africa 
contributed $5 billion.192 This arrangement ideally provides liquidity 
support and short-term balance of payment pressures at the request of 
any member state. Access to the precautionary and liquidity 
instruments is limited to a multiple of a member’s contribution. Thus, 
China’s access rate is limited to a multiplier of 0.5; Brazil, India, and 
Russia each have access to a multiplier of 1; and South Africa has 
access to a multiplier of 2.193 Thus, the NDB’s emergency reserve pool 
is much smaller when compared with the IMF’s reserve pool, which is 
able to lend $1 trillion to its member countries.194  
Both NDB and AIIB were initiated by emerging economies and, 
as a result, have similar objectives and common interests. These 
objectives and common interests include providing financial resources 
for infrastructure connectivity and sustained development projects in 
emerging economies and developing countries.195 Despite these 
common objectives, unlike the AIIB’s shareholding structure and 
voting rules, the NDB follows the principle of stakeholder equality—
each of five member countries contributes 20% of its start-up capital 
189 BRICS New Development to Finance $2.5-3 Bln Worth Projects in 2017, NEW DEV. 
BANK NEWSROOM (June 17, 2016), https://www.ndb.int/media/brics-new-development-
bank-finance-2-5-3-bln-worth-projects-2017/. 
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Prospects of the BRICS New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank 15 (Overseas Dev. Inst., Working Paper No. 418, 2015), https://www.odi.org/sites/ 
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($100 billion) and enjoys 20% of the total voting power.196 In short, no 
single NDB member state has veto power.197  
Chinese policy banks, commercial banks, and state-owned 
enterprises have invested $900 billion in the OBOR Initiative;198 
however, sovereigns nations with identifiable OBOR projects received 
speculative grades regarding potential credit risk and market risk, 
ranging from the “B” to “BBB.”199 In addition, even if this strategy 
enlarges China’s economic and geopolitical influence and brings forth 
alternative development finance in the current global financial system, 
infrastructure financing projects face challenges associated with low 
return with high risk.200 For example, of the seventy-one OBOR 
initiative countries,201 nearly half do not have credit ratings. Moreover, 
of the OBOR initiative countries with a credit rating, only 58.8% 
reached ratings of “BBB” or above.202  
The BRI is an extension of China’s long-term, national “going 
global” strategy. The CDB played a key role in its implementation. The 
CDB financed Chinese investments overseas with low interest rates and 
long-term loans, becoming the largest development bank in the 
process.203 Specifically, the CDB opened the overseas market through 
financing Huawei and ZTE.204 Huawei received $10 billion each year 
196 See AIIB Articles of Agreement, supra note 178, at art. 6, 10. 
197 See id. at art. 6. 
198 See Embracing the BRI Ecosystem in 2018, DELOITTE (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www2. 
deloitte.com/us/en/insights/economy/asia-pacific/china-belt-and-road-initiative.html?icid= 
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from CDB after 2004.205 In 2004, CDB agreed to provide a credit line 
of $10 billion for Huawei to develop overseas customers, and in 2009 
this credit line was tripled to $30 billion.206 
B. OBOR Countries’ Financial Risks
Financial risks may directly or indirectly threaten any project’s 
completion. Many OBOR countries adopt foreign exchange control or 
capital control policies.207 Aside from the risk of currency depreciation, 
foreign investors will have to avoid losses from the inability to convert 
local currency into foreign exchange or transfer constraints of outbound 
funds in the host country. Moreover, factors including illiquidity 
premium, Greenfield risk premium, and emerging market risk premium 
also affect an infrastructure project’s returns.208 Some counterparty 
developing countries may suffer from heavy debt burden and financial 
risks. A research report issued by the Centre for Global Development 
(CGD) in March 2018 found that twenty-three countries were “at risk 
of debt distress today” due to OBOR lending.209 In particular, eight 
of the countries (Djibouti, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Maldives, 
Mongolia, Pakistan, and Montenegro) were “vulnerable to debt distress 
due to future OBOR-related financing.”210 It is reported that Pakistan 
may have to ask the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a bailout, 
as its economy is heavily indebted.211 As a matter of fact, debt 
sustainability has become a serious challenge for many BRI loan 
recipients.212  
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C. The Case of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC):
“Debt Trap”? 
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a 3,218-kilometer-
long route, connects the Pakistani port of Gwadar to the Chinese city 
of Kashgar.213 In November 2015, China and Pakistan reached 
an agreement on the CPEC, after negotiations and the signing of 
a memorandum of understanding on this more than fifteen-year-long 
project.214 In its early phase, China provided $46 billion as a 
commitment for investment and concessional loans in highways, 
railways, and pipelines. The CPEC Projects are composed of twenty-
one energy projects (fifteen power projects, four actively promoted 
projects, and two potential energy projects), eight infrastructure 
projects, the twelve projects of the Gwadar Sea Port, four rail-based 
mass transit projects, and three ICT projects.215 By early 2017, China 
had invested $62 billion in the CPEC,216 which is regarded as the 
flagship of the BRI routes.217 It is estimated that the actual cost will be 
$75 billion, and China plans to complete most construction in 2020.218 
From the China side, building the CPEC will shorten the maritime 
transport from the Middle East to Shanghai for China’s oil freight. This 
will save time and transaction costs because the current distance 
accounting for 80% of China’s oil freight to Shanghai via the Strait of 
Malacca is nearly 16,000 kilometers.219 After the Gwadar Sea Port 
comes into operation, the distance will be shortened to less than 5,000 
kilometers.220 Compared with other OBOR routes, the CPEC appears 
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to have less opportunity costs in acquiring land and compensation.221 
In this forty-year deal, China obtained 91% of shares in gross revenues 
from the Gwadar Sea Port, as well as 85% of the shares from revenues 
of the free-trade zone around the port. China will operate the Gwadar 
Port for forty years through build-operate-transfer (BOT), and China 
plans to recoup its CPEC expenditure by 2020 from the earnings of the 
Gwadar Port.222 Along with the major share of earnings, companies in 
the 2,282-acre free-trade zone around Gwadar Port, including factories, 
warehouses, logistics hubs, and display centers, are exempted from 
customs duties and provincial and federal taxes.223  
As far as Pakistan is concerned, the government of Pakistan expects 
that the CPEC will directly create 700,000 jobs from 2015 to 2030 and 
boost its economic growth up to 2.5%.224 Nevertheless, there are 
critiques against some contractual terms of the Gwadar Port agreement 
between Pakistani authorities and the China Overseas Port Holding 
Company.225 Mir Hasil Bizenjo, Pakistan’s Federal Minister for Ports 
and Shipping, disclosed that Pakistan would pay back $16 billion for 
loans from Chinese banks at rates of more than 13% (including 7% 
insurance charges).226 Some Senators worried that this deal might be a 
heavy debt burden and may undermine Pakistan’s national interests.227 
Business people argued that infrastructure, roads, machinery, and other 
facilities would not be in workable condition after forty years and 
that upgrading and maintenance would have substantial costs.228 
Additionally, contractors and subcontractors associated with the China 
Overseas Port Holding Company are offered “an exemption from 
income and sales taxes, and federal excise duties, for a period of 20 
years, besides a 40-year tax holiday granted for imports of equipment, 
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material, plant, appliances and accessories for port and special 
economic zone.”229 It turns out that Pakistan had to ask the IMF for a 
bailout because its economy is heavily indebted.230 For Pakistan and 
other distressed OBOR countries, debt sustainability has become a 
serious challenge for many OBOR loan recipients. 
Of the sixty-eight BRI partner countries, twenty-seven countries’ 
sovereign debt was “junk rated,” or below investment grade, and 
fourteen countries’ sovereign debt was not rated at all, according to the 
three major international credit rating agencies: Standard & Poor’s, 
Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings.231 In addition, eight countries (Djibouti, 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Maldives, Mongolia, Pakistan and 
Montenegro) are at risk of debt distress due to BRI lending.232  
D. Debt Sustainability
A research report issued by the Center for Global Development 
(CGD) in March 2018 found that twenty-three BRI countries were 
“significantly or highly vulnerable to debt distress,”233 assessed by 
transparency, project pipeline, project implementation, and debt-
growth dynamics.234 Eight of the twenty-three countries (Pakistan, 
Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Maldives, Montenegro 
and Laos) are already in trouble due to increased BRI lending.235 There 
are between thirty-one and thirty-five heavily indebted poor countries 
(HIPC), including eight heavily debt-distressed Asian countries.236 
Since 2017, BRI has encountered barriers in Malaysia, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Cambodia, Nepal, the Philippines, and Pakistan due to “debt 
trap.”237  
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The CGD report examined cases where China provided debt 
relief for debt-distressed BRI countries—from 100% tax relief, to 
exchanges for debt-to-equity, long-term lease of land, ports, or other 
infrastructure.238 The CGD report proposed three recommendations on 
how to fix the BRI-related debt distress. The first recommendation was 
to turn the BRI from China-centered into a multilateral mechanism. The 
second recommendation was to introduce lending standards.239 For 
example, China may join the Paris Club and adopt the Paris Club’s 
collective action approach. Alternatively, China can consider the “G20 
Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing” to pursue its 
leadership in this international mega-infrastructure scheme. The third 
recommendation was that China becomes a donor.240  
It is widely reported that in 2017 Sri Lanka had to grant China 
Merchants Group (which paid $1.12 billion for 85% of shares of 
Hambantota Port in the Indian Ocean) a ninety-nine-year lease on the 
Port in order to avoid a debt default.241 Although the Beijing 
government has conducted strong propaganda, the China-centered Belt 
and Road Initiative has recently encountered barriers. Out of a fear of 
the debt trap and Beijing’s growing geopolitical influence, Malaysia 
suspended multiple China-funded BRI projects in August 2018, 
including the $20 billion East Coast Rail Link and two gas pipelines 
valued at $2.3 billion.242 Meanwhile, Myanmar trimmed its high-
interest rate loans from China CITIC Group from $7.3 billion to $1.3 
billion for the Kyaukpyu Deepwater Port in Rakhine state. This port 
was regarded as the BRI’s key pillar to link the Indian Ocean and 
Yunnan Province, and it avoided the Malacca Straits for China’s oil 
pipelines.243 Pakistan, a recipient of China’s $62 billion lending for 
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railway, highways, and Gwadar Port, evaluated its ballooned 
international debts and approached the IMF for a bailout.244 
Debt unsustainability makes many BRI-participating countries 
reconsider their projects.245 In late 2017, a few countries, including 
Pakistan, Nepal, and Myanmar, canceled a few hydropower projects 
with Chinese companies, valued at $20 billion.246 For example, 
Nepal canceled the $2.5 billion Budhi Gandaki hydroelectric project, 
which was signed by the former pro-Beijing government with China 
Gezhouba Group Corporation in November 2017.247 Meanwhile, 
Nepal turned to India and permitted GMR Group and Satluj Jal Vidyut 
Nigam Limited (two Indian companies) to build a 1,400-MW 
hydropower project each.248 In mid-November 2017, it was reported 
that Pakistan rejected the $14 billion Diamer-Bhasha Dam and 
requested that Beijing exclude that dam from the (CPEC) 
framework.249 The original estimated project cost was $5 billion, but 
later it increased to $14 billion.250  
E. The Escalating Trade Conflicts and
China’s Own Financial Risks
Over the last decade, China has experienced quite a few rounds of 
mass financialization, ranging from the four-trillion-yuan economic 
stimulus scheme in 2008,251 local governments’ off-budget fiscal 
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stimulus, and a boom of municipal corporate bonds from 2012 to 2016, 
to the credit-fueled stimulus after 2016.252 Each round has strengthened 
China’s financial leverage and debt-to-GDP ratio.253 In November 
2017, Mr. Zhou Xiaochuan, China’s former Central Bank Governor, 
warned of China’s potentially “sudden, contagious and hazardous” 
financial risks, as well as high leverage ratio, liquidity risk, credit risk, 
cross-sector, and cross-market shadow banking.254  
In addition, oversupply of currencies has become serious after the 
global financial crisis.255 Accompanying the three rounds of 
Quantitative Easing in 2008, 2010, and 2012, inflows of hot money 
(massive liquidity) flushed into China and other emerging markets.256 
At the same time, China printed tremendous amounts of currency.257 In 
2012, China accounted for almost half of new money supply and 
became the largest money printer in the world.258 In July 2019, China’s 
M2 reached CNY 191.94 trillion.259  
The competition between the Belt and Road Initiative and the 
Indo-Pacific Strategy occurs in the context of an escalating trade war 
and geopolitical tensions. The United States adding tariffs on $550 
billion worth of Chinese goods and products has impacts on both 
Chinese exports and the Chinese financial sector.260 Furthermore, 
the trade conflicts have expanded to energy, technology, human 
rights, currencies, and the financial markets.261 The macroeconomic 
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consequences will substantially affect China’s financing of BRI 
projects. 
CONCLUSION: 
INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY TOWARD PRODUCTIVITY 
There are three pillars for sustainable development and productivity 
growth: innovation, human capital, and infrastructure.262 Of these three 
pillars, infrastructure, as one of the largest sectors, matters substantially 
for global economic growth, but construction has a poor record in 
productivity.263 Over the past two decades, although the world has 
spent 13% of global GDP (approximately $10 trillion annually) on 
construction-related goods and services, this sector only ever increases 
1% productivity each year.264 Compared with the growth rates over the 
past two decades in other sectors, such as 3.6% in manufacturing and 
2.8% in the world economy, the construction sector could boost its 
productivity and increase its value added by $1.6 trillion a year, or 2% 
of the world’s GDP.265 A McKinsey & Company research report in 
2017 indicates that acting in concert in certain areas, such as reshaping 
regulatory and contractual frameworks, improving engineering 
processes and procurement, applying new materials and digital 
technology, and focusing on reskilled manpower, would boost this 
sector’s productivity by 50%–60%.266  
On the other hand, the investment efficiency is not good. According 
to the McKinsey Global Institute, 40% of the world’s infrastructure 
investments (or about $1 trillion a year) was not spent effectively, or 
could have been saved.267 For example, improving the selection of 
bankable projects and optimizing the infrastructure portfolio could save 
two hundred billion dollars; through streamlining delivery, global 
infrastructure investment $400 billion could save; and it could reduce 
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$200 billion in demand management (including $100 billion in 
“operations and reduction of transmission and distribution losses” and 
$100 billion in optimized maintenance).268 As mentioned previously, 
there is a potential to improve 60% of current infrastructure 
productivity.269 Through improving project preparation, structuring, 
and delivery, global infrastructure productivity can be increased by $20 
trillion by 2030.270  
Investment efficiency leads to higher productivity, as both 
underinvestment and overinvestment do harm to economic growth and 
lead to economic fragility.271 Three methods can be used in savings, 
each with different benefits: (1) optimizing project portfolios could 
save $200 billion a year around the world; (2) streamlining delivery 
could speed up timelines and thus generate savings of up to $400 billion 
a year; (3) boosting asset utilization, optimizing maintenance planning, 
and improving the effectiveness of demand-management approaches of 
existing infrastructure could save up to $400 billion a year globally.272 
Furthermore, both public infrastructure investment and private sector 
investment are important for development finance.273 The key issue is 
how to coordinate different development strategies to promote trade 
and economic growth. To boost productivity growth, the OBOR 
program, as well as other regional or international infrastructure 
initiatives, must value quality, sustainable, and inclusive infrastructure. 
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